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LISTING STRATEGIES AND HOUSING BUSTS:  
CUTTING LOSS OR CUTTING LIST PRICE? 
 
 XIAOLONG LIU 
1*






Listing house for sale has been referred to as being among the most agonizing and 
stressful decisions of homeowners that go with home sale. This may seem particularly 
true for homeowners expecting to sell for less than their original purchase price. In 
this paper, we investigate whether listing strategies among homeowners who face 
potential loss differ from those who do not. We use MLS data from the Randstad area 
of The Netherlands for the period 2008 - 2013 for which we have detailed information 
regarding the listing strategies. We find that homeowners who expect potential loss 
upon sale set higher initial list prices by 10% on average than those homeowners who 
do not. However, only motivated sellers with prospective loss upon initial listing are 
more likely to revise their list prices downward than other sellers. Given list-price 
revision occurs, sellers who are exposed to potential loss tend to cut list prices more 
aggressively than sellers who are not. Finally, despite revealed aggressive list-price 
cutting by sellers with potential loss, we show that the effect of potential loss is 
present throughout property listing process such that potential loss faced by sellers 
impacts property final list price.   
Keywords: housing; loss; list-price revision; STAR model 
JEL Classification: D83; R21 
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 Do loss-bearing homeowners prefer cutting loss upon property listing over 
cutting list price at times of housing market busts? Listing strategy, or the initial list 
price setting and associated list-price revisions, is one of the classical problems of 
homeowners in selling their home. This is because sellers, when setting the initial list 
price, call upon informed brokers and use the observed prices of surrounding 
properties, and they never actually observe a demand curve. Setting a list price is not 
immaterial. As selling a home is typically about selling one’s largest financial asset, 
list price setting and revisions has long-term financial implications. Listing a house 
for sale has been referred to as being among the most agonizing and stressful 
decisions associated with home sale. This may seem particularly true for homeowners 
expecting to sell for less than their original (nominal) purchase price during market 
busts. It is the topic of this paper to compare listing strategies among homeowners 
who, during housing market downturn, expect potential loss when listing their 
property on the market vis-à-vis those who do not.  
 The issue of listing strategies connects to the dynamic search and pricing 
literature in which sellers learn about demand and set prices accordingly. Sellers while 
waiting for potential buyers to arrive may set and subsequently change their list prices 
during property marketing period (Knight, 2002; Herrin et al., 2004; Merlo and 
Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Haurin et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2012; De Wit and Van der 
Klaauw, 2013; and Bucchianeri and Minson, 2013). As compared to the rather 
established literature on listing strategies, little is known about listing strategies when 
sellers face potential loss and whether they decide to cut loss upon market entry, or 
cut list price subsequently. What has been observed by Genesove and Mayer (2001) is 
that nominal loss induces sellers to set higher list prices upon market entry than 
market prices associated with the prevailing market conditions.
 1
 Sellers set list prices 
at an above-average price in hope of selling at a relatively high price in the end and 
thus minimizing their loss. Given positive holding costs, however, sellers over time 
may subsequently lower list prices as they learn about or are exposed to market 
conditions. This can possibly be understood in reference to demand uncertainty. Since 
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 Genesove and Mayer (2001) find for downtown Boston in the 1990s list price markups as large as 25-




most moves are local, with seller and buyer in the very same housing market, 
competition for informed buyers will erode any markup of list price over expected 
selling price (Balvers and Cosimano, 1990). In practice, then, during a housing market 
bust, setting a markup upon market entry may result in subsequent list price revisions. 
On the one hand, because the list-price setting due to prospective loss may intensify 
the pressure on sellers to increase their markup upon market entry and subsequently 
cut list prices to compete for potential buyers. These sellers may, therefore, learn from 
the market and lower their reservation price. While the reservation price is not 
observed, changes in it can be inferred from list-price cutting, or withdrawal from the 
market.
2
 On the other hand, since the listing strategies of sellers are bounded by the 
reference point, for instance, original purchase price, below which their disutility will 
be increasing and convex (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), list price revisions may not 
be obvious if potential loss is expected. Overall, whether potential loss plays a role in 
determining list price cutting is, in part, an open question, and it constitutes the central 
question of this research. 
 In this paper, we investigate the effect of potential loss on list-price updates. 
We postulate that, if changes in reservation price are reflected in list-price updates, 
sellers who expect loss in a market downturn will be less inclined to respond to actual 
market conditions by revising their list prices downward as compared to sellers who 
are likely to realize capital gains. This paper contributes to the literature in 
considering the impact of potential loss on list-price dynamics. Previous studies of 
Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Anenberg (2011) have concentrated primarily on the 
effect of loss on initial list price and/or on final sales price, while neglecting the entire 
list-price updating process in between. Their findings can be considered to be a 
combination of list-price updating effect and bargaining effect. We use rich data to 
model listing dynamics, and focus on sellers who are subject to potential loss upon 
market entry and its implication on list-price updating during the entire property 
listing stage, that is from the initial listing date to the last listing date. While previous 
research predominately focuses on the U.S. housing market, the current research 
utilizes data from the Dutch housing market with unique market institutions. The 
Dutch housing market differs from the U.S. housing market in two notable aspects. 
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 Horowitz (1986) and Deng et al. (2012) argue that the list price conveys information to potential 
buyers in the form of an upper bound on the seller’s reservation price. 
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First, the Dutch housing market is characterized by high loan-to-value ratio as  down-
payment is not required by Dutch mortgage providers. Second, Dutch mortgages are 
structured with full recourse. As strategic defaults are not possible, the number of 
foreclosures has been negligible relative to the total amount of mortgages outstanding 
in the market throughout Dutch housing market cycle.
3
 These institutional differences 
may lead to a different mechanism as to how equity position may affect list price 
setting by sellers. Comparing with sellers in the U.S. who tend to set high list price 
due to equity constraint and/or the embedded put option on non-recourse mortgages, 
the recourse mortgage structure may be the single source of constraint that affect list-
price setting by Dutch sellers. As compared to the previous literature that employs 
standard hedonic regression specification to estimate the expected property sales price 
in order to measure the prospective loss faced by the seller at the date of market entry, 
we propose to use the spatial-temporal autoregressive (STAR) model to predict the 
expected property sales price. The STAR model incorporates not only the housing 
structural attributes, but also the information concerning housing spatial neighbors 
when predicting the expected sales price of the subject property, which yields better 
predication precision as compared to the standard hedonic model.
4
 Lastly, this paper 
complements the extensive existing literature on list-price revisions, for instance, 
Balvers and Cosimano (1990), Knight (2002), Herrin et al. (2004), Yang and Ye 
(2008), Haurin et al. (2010), Deng et al. (2012), and De Wit and Van der Klaauw 
(2013). While these papers generally neglect the impact of potential loss on list-price 
updating process, we emphasize on the list-price revision revealed by sellers who face 
potential loss upon initial listing.  
 Our findings for the Netherlands during the 2008-2013 housing bust support 
earlier findings for the U.S. housing market as reported by Genesove and Mayer 
(2001) and Anenberg (2011). While we find larger effect of prospective loss on initial 
list-price setting for the Netherlands during the recent bust, we also show that, as 
compared to sellers who are not bounded by expected loss at the date of the initial 
property listing, sellers with prospective loss tend to be more likely to revise their list 
prices downward, which seems to be driven by their underlying motivation to sell. 
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 The annual number of foreclosures for The Netherlands over these years varies between 2,000 - 3,000 
units on an owner-occupier stock of 3.9 million housing units (De Keijzer and Van der Vlist, 2015).  
4
 For the details of the STAR model, we refer to Pace et al. (1998). For instance, Liu (2013) finds that 
the STAR model outperforms the hedonic model in terms of out-of-sample prediction of house prices. 
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This indicates that sellers indeed respond to the market condition after property is 
listed despite prospective loss. Furthermore, given the occurrence of list-price revision, 
sellers who face potential loss are more aggressive in cutting list price than those who 
do not. We report a positive impact of potential loss on final list price, however. We 
interpret this as the evidence that, despite the more aggressive list-price updating 
revealed by sellers expecting loss upon initial listing, the impact of expected loss 
remains present in the entire property listing process. We find that our results are 




 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 explains the procedure for measuring the perspective loss. Section 
4 introduces the empirical model. Data is described in Section 5, followed by 
presentation and discussion of the main empirical results in Section 6. Section 7 
reports robustness check results. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 Why potential loss impacts homeowners’ initial list-price setting is of great 
importance in understanding homeowners’ list-price cutting over the listing period. 
Homeowners set initial list prices in a housing market characterized by imperfect 
information, search frictions, and behavioral bias towards loss (Knight, 2002; Herrin 
et al., 2004; Haurin et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2012). As a result, the initial list price is 
set on the basis of expected sale price and sale time, while taking into account 
property characteristics and personal constraints in order to maximize the gain from 
sale.  
 List prices reveal sellers’ private information about financial constraints as 
well as their motivation to sell. Listing strategies may further reflect sellers’ 
behavioral bias in terms of being unwilling to accept lower market prices than the 
seller’s initial purchase price. The asymmetry of greater disutility from losses than 
utility from comparable gains leads to higher initial list prices to prevent potential loss 
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 One caveat is that we do not observe buyers' characteristics. While buyer heterogeneity may 
potentially affect listing behavior, we think that buyer heterogeneity is of particular importance in the 
bargaining phase and less so in the listing phase. 
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(Genesove and Mayer, 2001). For the Boston condominium market, Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) find evidence of loss aversion by showing that sellers subject to 
nominal loss set higher list prices. A similar result, yet on sales prices, has been found 
by Anenberg (2011) for the San Francisco Bay Area. This phenomenon relates to the 
behavior of investors observed in financial markets that investors are more readily to 
realize gains than losses (Odean, 1998; Weber and Camerer, 1998). Bokhari and 
Geltner (2011) find similar behavior for professional investors in the commercial real 
estate market. Based on commercial real estate sales from the U.S., they find that a 10 
percent increase in the prospective loss will lead a seller to raise his list price by 3.8 
percent. The underlying mechanism is that home sellers, either with or without real 
estate brokers’ advice, tend to set prices higher than their reservation prices that are 
based on certain reference points. Sellers may use information on their initial purchase 
price (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), the expected list price of concurrently listed 
homes (Bucchianeri and Minson, 2013), or the expected sales price based on 
historical sales (Anenberg, 2011; De Wit and Van der Klaauw, 2013) in order to set 
their markup and list price upon market entry. Consequently, the degree of markup 
setting may impact the list-price adjustments subsequently (Hoeberichts et al., 2013).  
 Listing dynamics or list-price cutting when marketing during housing market 
busts, relate to sellers, who, after setting their initial list price, adjust the list price. The 
change in list price may come from various sources: accommodating change in 
personal circumstances, and/or deviation of priori expectations from market reality. In 
this sense, list-price setting is a dynamic process. For instance, sellers set initial list 
prices, taking into account the property characteristics relative to properties within the 
neighborhood (Herrin et al., 2004) along with local economic (housing) conditions 
(Haurin et al., 2010). Over time, a seller may subsequently update the list price. List-
price adjustments may vary during different market cycles. Hoeberichts et al. (2013) 
use hazard approach to show that, due to overpricing, there is a higher probability of 
list-price cutting during a market boom, while list-price adjustment is less likely 
during a market bust. In general, list-price updating seems widely present in housing 
markets. De Wit and Van der Klaauw (2013) report that 20% of sellers update their 
initial list price in the Netherlands, Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) report 23% for 
the UK, while Herrin et al. (2004) and Knight (2002) report 37% and 38% 
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respectively for the U.S. Consequently, list-price cutting subsequent to the initial 
listing may potentially remove all of the effect of expected loss on the final list price.  
 Finally, listing strategies may also reflect anchoring, or insufficient adjustment 
by sellers during marketing time (Bucchianeri and Minson, 2013), in which case final 
list prices still reflect the effect of expected loss and forms a test as to whether sellers 
in housing busts aim at cutting loss or eventually cutting list price in order to sell.  
3. Measuring prospective loss with the STAR model  
 To investigate the listing strategies of sellers who face potential loss upon 
initial listing during market busts, we carry out the empirical analysis in two stages. 
We first approach the issue of measuring the prospective loss that a seller is likely to 
experience when the property is first listed on the market. Given the previous 
purchase price, an accurate measure of the prospective loss amounts to the estimation 
precision of property expected sales price on its listing date. We explicitly take into 
account spatial correlation among property transactions in that previous neighboring 
property sales carry important pricing information for the target property, for example, 
the market trend or neighborhood amenities. Hence, the error terms of the hedonic 
model tend to be correlated along the spatial-temporal dimension. We therefore use 
the STAR model to predict the expected housing sales price. The STAR model takes 
into account the spatial dependence inherent in housing transactions, thus contributing 
to superior in-sample as well as out-of-sample performance relative to the standard 
hedonic model (Case et al., 2004; Liu, 2013). It is also less affected by the omitted 
variable problem, since the spatial-temporal lag terms in the STAR model are capable 
of capturing the latent unobservable influences on house prices (LeSage and Pace, 
2009). 
 The STAR model is specified as  
(1) 𝑌 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢    
 
where 𝑌 is a 𝑛 × 1 vector of log transaction prices, 𝑋 denotes an 𝑛 × 𝑘 matrix which 
includes housing structural attributes, 𝛽 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of marginal implicit prices 
corresponding to 𝑘 housing attributes, and 𝑢 refers to an 𝑛 × 1 vector of error terms. 
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To account for the correlated errors, 𝑢 is subsumed to follow an autoregressive error 
process such that 
(2) 𝑢 = 𝑊𝑢 + 𝜀    
 
where 𝑊  is a 𝑛 × 𝑛  weighting matrix, and 𝜀  is a 𝑛 × 1  vector of white noise. 
Combining (1) and (2), we can write the STAR model in a compact form as follows, 
(3) (𝐼 − 𝑊)𝑌 = (𝐼 − 𝑊)𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 
   
 A general specification of 𝑊, as in Pace et al. (1998), would be 
(4) 𝑊 = 𝜑𝑆𝑆 + 𝜑𝑇𝑇 + 𝜑𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑇 + 𝜑𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆  
 
where 𝑆  and 𝑇  are spatial and temporal weighting matrices with 𝜑𝑆  and 𝜑𝑇  as the 
corresponding spatial and temporal dependence parameters. S𝑇  and 𝑇𝑆  are the 
interaction matrices that allow for the potential compounding spatial-temporal effects 
with 𝜑𝑆𝑇 and 𝜑𝑇𝑆 as their coefficients. Liu (2013) shows that, among the weighting 
matrices composing 𝑊, including the spatial weighting matrix 𝑆 in 𝑊alone will yield 
better out-of-sample prediction results as compared to those produced by using the 
model that incorporates the general specification of 𝑊 as in (4). This is mainly due to 
the fact that, by construction, the spatial weighting matrix 𝑆 also contains a temporal 
dimension because only previously sold properties serve as candidates to be 
considered as neighbors to the target property. Therefore, to a certain extent, 𝜑𝑆 also 
absorbs the temporal dependence that is supposed to be captured by 𝜑𝑇. Following 
Liu (2013), in estimating the STAR model, we restrict the weighting matrix 𝑊 to 
contain the spatial weighting matrix 𝑆 only, such that 
(5) 𝑊 = 𝜑𝑆𝑆 
 
 Combining (3) and (5), the restricted STAR model that will be utilized in the 
following analysis to predict the expected housing sales price is as follows,  




where  𝛽1 = 𝜑𝑆𝛽 . We structure the spatial weighting matrix 𝑆  on the basis of the 
ordinal distance which alleviates the problems of uneven housing densities (Pace et al., 
1998). The spatial neighbors are identified first by calculating the Euclidean distance 
𝑑𝑖𝑗  between every pair of housing sales 𝑗 and 𝑖 for every housing sale 𝑗 that occurs 
prior to the housing sale 𝑖 (𝑇𝑗 < 𝑇𝑖). After sorting all calculated Euclidean distances, 
we can find the spatial neighbors relative to every housing sale which are ranked from 
the closest to the farthest in terms of distance. For simplicity, we structure the spatial 
weighting matrix 𝑆 by limiting the existence of spatial dependence to be within 50 
(𝑚𝑆 = 50) spatial neighbors. The implementation of model (6) also requires the 
specification of the spatial decay parameter which essentially measures the declining 
impact of previous housing sales on the current property as these houses move further 
away. We follow Liu (2013) in taking the spatial decay parameter to be 0.8.
6
 It is 
worth noting that, after filtering out the spatial neighbors for each housing transaction, 
the parameter estimates of model (6) are obtained using the previous 5,000 housing 
sales to predict the value of the current property on its listing date. Therefore, these 
parameter estimates are updated continuously with new housing listings entering the 
market.  
 After obtaining the expected housing sales price prediction based on all sales, 
both single and repeat sales, using the STAR model (6), we follow Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) and determine the prospective nominal loss associated with each 
property i upon market entry by the natural log difference between the previous 
purchase price and the expected sales price at the date of listing truncated from below 
at zero, that is  
(7) 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 = max (ln(𝑃𝑖𝑠) − ln(?̂?𝑖𝑡) , 0)  
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where 𝑠 < 𝑡, and, 𝑃𝑖𝑠 is the initial purchase price while ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is the predicted expected 
sales price on the housing listing date.
7
 Alternatively, the prospective loss can be 
represented by a dummy variable where  
(8) 
𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 = {
1, 𝑃𝑖𝑠 > ?̂?𝑖𝑡
0, otherwise
  
4. Empirical model 
 To analyze the interplay between the listing strategy of sellers and prospective 
loss, we first examine whether these sellers cut loss upon market entry with the 
following hedonic model,  
(9) 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝑍𝑖𝛿 + 𝜔𝑖  
 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖) is the log list price of property i, 𝛼 is the constant, 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 
represents the expected loss of property i which corresponds to either of the two loss 
measures, being 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 and 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖  with 𝜏 as its coefficient. 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of dimension 
1 × 𝑘 that includes all control variables, such as housing characteristics, transaction 
time, etc. for property i, with 𝛿 being a 𝑘 × 1 vector of its corresponding coefficients. 
𝜔𝑖 is an error term. If prospective-loss bearing sellers cut loss instantly upon property 
listing, we would expect the coefficient of loss, that is, 𝜏, to be non-positive.  
 We use the following Probit model to investigate the potential impact of 
prospective loss on the probability of subsequent list-price revision,  
(10) 𝑃(𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁,𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = (𝑋𝑖𝛾) 
 
that estimates the probability of list-price revision for property 𝑖, that is, 𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑣,𝑖 =
1, as a function of a number of determinants, including 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖  or 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 and other 
control variables, summarized by 𝑎 1 × 𝑘 vector 𝑋𝑖 . ( . )  is the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. If sellers facing potential loss 
are reluctant to revise list prices due to aversion to loss, we would expect the 
coefficient of 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 or 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  to be negative in the Probit model. However, if these 
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 The Loss measure is not loss actually incurred, but a noisy proxy for the true nominal loss if the seller 
were to sell at the expected sales price (see Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Anenberg, 2011).  
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sellers learn from the market after being exposed to actual market conditions, the 
coefficient is expected to be positive. 
 Applying the following Tobit model, we further investigate the degree of list-
price updates by sellers with and without prospective loss, 
(11) 
 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = {
𝑥𝑖𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖 if  𝑥𝑖𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖  > 0
 0       if  𝑥𝑖𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖  ≤ 0
}  
 
where  𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  is the percentage of list-price revision relative to the 
initial list price for property 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 is defined similarly as in model (10) with vector 𝜃 
containing corresponding coefficients. 𝜖𝑖 is the error term.  
 Finally, to assess whether the potential list-price updating is sufficient in that 
the effect of potential loss is dominated by learning or exposure to the market, we test 
if potential loss exerts impact on the property final list price using model (9). If there 
is sufficient list-price revision, we would expect that the expected loss will no longer 
affect the final list price. 
 
5. Dutch Housing Data 
5.1 The Dutch housing market 
        The Dutch housing market exhibits cyclical pattern. Figure 1 depicts the Dutch 
housing market trend over the period between 2000 and 2016 in terms of both price 
and transaction volume. Three phases of market development are clearly distinguished. 
Until 2008, nominal house prices grew rapidly and steadily across the whole country 
as well as in the four largest cities, Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam and Utrecht. In 
the meantime, housing transaction volume exhibited high correlation with the house 
price movement for the whole country. Among the four largest cities, the transaction 
volume in Amsterdam experienced a dramatic increase with more than two folds in 
comparison with that in other three cities. The housing market boom reached its peak 
in 2008 and the market started to turn around due to the global financial crisis. House 
price on the country level decreased more substantially than that in the four cities after 
2008. In comparison with the house price development, the unequivocal decline in 
12 
 
housing transaction volume was portrayed in the post-2008 market downturn. The 
market bottomed out in 2013 and both the (nominal) house price and the transaction 
volume started to recover in early 2014.  
 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands and Authors’ Own Calculation 
Figure 1. Dutch housing market trends – Nominal house price and transaction volume 
(1995 = 100) 
 
5.2 Data 
 Our data set consists of listed properties from the Dutch Randstad region 
(see Figure 2). The Dutch Randstad region is a conurbation in the Netherlands, which 
is formed by parts of four Dutch provinces, North Holland, South Holland, Utrecht 
and Flevoland. The country’s four largest cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag 
and Utrecht are all located within the Randstad, as well as the seaport of Rotterdam, 
Schiphol airport, and the railway terminal of Utrecht. The region has a population of 
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of the Dutch land area. A wide range of economic activities is hosted within the 




Figure 2. Dutch Randstad Area 
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 The listed properties in our data span the period from 2008 to 2013. During 
this period, the Dutch housing market experienced a downward spiral in terms of both 
transaction volume and price due to the global financial crisis. Our data is assembled 
by the Dutch Association of Real Estate Brokers and Real Estate Experts (NVM), 
which can be seen as representative of the Randstad housing market since NVM 
covers approximately 75% of total transactions in the Dutch housing market in recent 
years.
9
 For every listed property in the data, we have information on the property as 
well as its listing strategy. The information includes housing attributes, location, and 
the housing submarket.
10
 Information pertaining to the listing updating strategy 
includes the first list date and price, the final list date and price, the final status of the 
property, that is, sale or withdrawal, and the transaction date and price if there is a sale. 
After removing those observations with missing or unreliable information, we have 
access to 319,609 listed properties. Among them, 199,112 properties succeeded in a 
sale eventually, and there were 27,747 listings with information on previous 
transaction price during the sampling period. We further remove flipped properties 
that are listed within six months since their last purchase from the 27,747 listings to 
end up with a working sample with 25,826 listings.   
 We use address information and timing of the property marketing to filter out 
the temporally sorted spatial neighbors for each house in order to predict its value on 
the listing date using model (6). This allows us to calculate the prospective loss upon 
initial listing using model (7) and model (8).  
 To proxy for property liquidity, we generate the dummy variable “Market 
thinness” that takes the value of 1 if the property’s first list price is above the 90th 
percentile in the distribution of “First list price” and 0 otherwise (For variable 
definitions, see Appendix A). As argued by Lazear (1986), owners of expensive 
properties are less subject to list-price revision than owners of apartments, which is 
simply because less information comes with few genuine buyers for expensive 
properties as compared to apartments.  
                                                          
9
 See www.nvm.nl/overnvm/about 
10
 The housing submarkets are the broker regions that are defined by the NVM, and 19 housing 
submarkets are distinguished in our dataset. 
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 Similarly, to capture the effect of housing atypicality on the list-price revision, 
we create the dummy variable “Atypicality”, similar to Haurin (1988) and Haurin et al. 
(2010), that takes the value of 1 if the property size either falls below the 10
th
 
percentile or lies above the 90
th
 percentile in the distribution of “Size”, and 0 
otherwise. A priori, the effect of atypicality on list-price updating is ambiguous. On 
one hand, list prices of atypical properties tend to be less likely to be revised 
downward during the listing process due to limited information about potential 
demand obtained from bids with greater variance (Haurin, 1988; Haurin et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, being aware of the greater variance in the buyer’s offer distribution, 
sellers of atypical homes will set their reservation prices relatively high as compared 
to the average of the buyers’ bidding distribution (Haurin, 1988; Glower, et al., 1998; 
Haurin, et al., 2010). However, high list price reduces the flow of potential buyers, 
which leads to fewer bids and less learning on the bidding distribution of the buyers 
(Knight, 2002). Therefore, relatively high initial list-price setting of atypical 
properties may induce subsequent list-price cutting in order to attract more bidders. 
 Furthermore, we include the variable “Markup” that is defined as the 
difference between the log initial list price and the log expected sales price on the 
initial listing date to control for the effect of overpricing on the likelihood of future 
list-price revision.
7 
We follow Yavas and Yang (1995), and first orthogonalize 
“Markup” with respect to LOSS terms before it is incorporated in the regression 
analysis. The inclusion of “Markup” also captures unobserved heterogeneity in the 
regression estimation. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. 
 The upper panel of Table 1 provides information regarding the listing 
dynamics. Comparing initial list price with final list price we observe that sellers, in 
general, cut list prices downward. About 27% of properties have experienced list-
price revision during the property marketing process.
11
 Furthermore, for listings with 
previous sale information, sellers of 27% of the listed properties are likely to realize 
prospective loss given the current market condition. With respect to sub-samples of 
listings based on the expected loss on the listing date, on average, the expected loss 
for the sub-sample with loss is 8.06%. What is remarkable is that, given the 
occurrence of expected loss, sellers set a substantial markup, amounting to 14.85% 
                                                          
11
 Out of 25,826 observations, 10 listings experienced upward revision during the listing process. 
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relative to the expected sales price. In comparison with other sellers who are not 
exposed to potential loss, the higher markup at the initial listing of sellers expecting 





Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
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N 319,609     25,826   
 
6,877     18,949   
Notes: Data cover the Randstad area, the Netherlands over the period of 2008 - 2013, and include listed properties 
that are either sold or withdrawn from the market.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.
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6. Empirical Results 
 Our estimation results are presented in Tables 2-5. First, in considering 
whether sellers cut loss or cut list price, we focus on the initial list-price setting. Table 
2 presents the results of model (9) that examines the potential impact of the 
prospective loss on the initial list-price setting. Results show that, if a seller expects 1% 
increase in potential loss on the initial listing date, list price will increase with 1.01%. 
This indicates that, during market busts, sellers facing expected nominal loss do not 
cut their loss instantly; instead, they tend to set higher list prices to minimize expected 
loss. Similar results are also found when we use the dummy loss, that is, 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 , in 
specification (2). On average, sellers expecting loss tend to set initial list prices 9.8% 
higher as compared to sellers not expecting loss for otherwise similar property.   
Table 2. Estimation results of the hedonic model for initial list price 
 (1)  (2)  
Loss  1.01 *** 
 
 




   
(0.003)  
Month dummy Yes 
 
Yes  
Year dummy Yes 
 
Yes  
Submarket dummy Yes 
 
Yes  










25,826   
Notes: This table presents the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of 
potential loss on the initial list-price setting. The dependent variable is the log initial list 
price. The independent variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon property initial listing and 
“D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Submarkets are the broker regions that are defined by the 
NVM, and 19 housing submarkets are distinguished in our dataset. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and 
* correspond to significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 These findings are consistent with Genesove and Mayer (2001) who document 
positive effect of prospective nominal loss on list prices for Boston housing market. 
With respect to the magnitude of the effect, we, however, find a considerably larger 
effect than that in Genesove and Mayer (2001). We conjecture that it relates to both 
cross-sectional differences and to differences relating to the time-period studied. The 
previous study considers Boston housing market, for which equity constraints are 
binding, and strategic default is a real possibility, contrary to the housing market we 
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consider here. Further, we examine a time period of housing bust after decades of 
house price appreciation, contrary to the previous study.  
 After setting up list prices, over time, sellers may adjust their list prices. To 
consider this in more detail, we report the results of the Probit model in Table 3. In the 
baseline specification (1), we include all variables except the LOSS terms. With the 
exception of property atypicality, all of the coefficient estimates are significant at 1% 
level. The coefficient of “Markup” is significantly positive. It implies that, for 
property listings with high markup, they will be more likely to experience price 
revision in the listing process, which is in line with Knight (2002). Atypical properties 
have a higher likelihood of list-price updating during the property-listing stage. This 
finding suggests that sellers of atypical homes are indeed concerned about the low 
arrival rate of potential buyers due to the relatively high list-price setting as compared 
to the average of the buyer’s bidding distribution. They respond to that by cutting list 
prices to stimulate more visits from potential buyers. Sellers of properties that have a 
thin market are less inclined to revise list prices. This is consistent with the 
predictions of Lazear (1986) and Knight (2002), who find that properties belonging to 
the highest price category are less likely to undergo list-price changes.  
 In specification (2), we augment the baseline model with the term “Loss” to 
examine whether sellers, who are exposed to potential loss upon market entry, may 
learn from the market such that they will revise their list price downward 
subsequently. The significantly positive coefficient of the variable “Loss” shows that, 
when homeowners face prospective loss upon property-listing, list prices are more 
likely to be revised. One reason for this is the revision in reservation price that is 
proxied by the list price during the property listing stage. The sellers’ willingness to 
update the list price demonstrates that they respond to market conditions after putting 
their properties on the market, and their psychological aversion to loss is contained to 
a certain extent by learning from market conditions. Similar results are obtained when 
“DLoss” is used to proxy for expected loss as shown in regression specification (3). 
With reference to the previous results on the positive effect of potential loss on list-
price setting, the current results imply that the impact of potential loss is at least 





Table 3. Probit regression results for list-price revisions 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Markup 0.913 *** 0.911 *** 0.849 *** 
 (0.081)  (0.082)  (0.084)  
Atypicality 0.086 ** 0.092 *** 0.091 *** 
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  
Market thinness -0.214 *** -0.234 *** -0.224 *** 
 (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.048)  
Loss    0.952 ***   
   (0.191)    
D Loss     0.137 *** 
     (0.021)  
Constant -0.612 *** -0.633 *** -0.649 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  
Log likelihood -15,037  -15,022  -15,011  
N 25,826  25,826  25,826  
Notes: This table presents the results of different specifications of the Probit model that 
examine the effect of prospective loss on the probability of list-price revision. The dependent 
variable is binary with list-price revision being 1 and 0 otherwise. The independent variables 
“Loss” is the potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the 
LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
  
 Admittedly, in considering whether sellers are cutting loss or cutting list price, 
the size of the list-price adjustment is perhaps more informative than the incidence of 
list-price adjustment. For this, we estimate using a Tobit model. Table 4 displays the 
results of the Tobit model (11), which quantify the magnitude of the list-price 
adjustment conditional on the occurrence of list-price revision. The baseline model 
specification (1) yields intuitive results with coefficients carrying the expected signs 
and being statistically significant. The coefficient of “Markup” (as is orthogonalized 
with respect to LOSS terms) reveals that greater list-price adjustment is expected for 
properties with higher markup initially. The list-price updating of properties that are 
atypical tend to be greater than other properties. The aggressive list-price cutting by 
the seller of an atypical home might be driven by concerns of too few bids or visits 
due to high initial list-price setting and competition for potential buyers subsequently. 
For properties that trade in thin markets, list-price cutting is 1.3% less than properties 
in relatively more liquid markets.  
 In model specification (2), we add the term “Loss” to the baseline model. Its 
coefficient is significantly positive which shows that, the more loss a seller is 
expected to incur, the more the list price is adjusted. Specifically, examining the 
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coefficient of variable “Loss”, for 10% perspective loss, a seller is willing to cut the 
list price by 0.91%. The seemingly minimal list-price updating may reflect sellers’ 
reluctance to cut the potential loss due to their physiological aversion to loss. When a 
loss dummy is included in the baseline model as in model specification (3), we find 
that sellers expecting loss tend to revise list price by 1.2% higher than other sellers.  
Table 4. Tobit regression results for list-price revisions 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Markup 0.062 *** 0.061 *** 0.056 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Atypicality 0.006 ** 0.006 *** 0.006 ** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Market thinness -0.013 *** -0.015 *** -0.013 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Loss    0.091 ***   
   (0.013)    
D Loss     0.012 *** 
     (0.001)  
Constant -0.043 *** -0.045 *** -0.046 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Log likelihood -399  -370  -359  
N 25,826  25,826  25,826  
Notes: This table presents the results of different specifications of the Tobit model that 
examine the effect of prospective loss on the degree of list-price revision given that list-price 
revision takes place. The dependent variable is the percentage of list-price revision relative to 
the initial list price that is censored from below. The independent variables “Loss” is the 
potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , 
** , and * correspond to significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  
 In considering the issue of whether sellers are to cut loss or list price, perhaps 
the information that is even more revealing is whether we still observe any effect of 
potential loss on the final list price. The final list price in this case is the observed list 
price before bargaining. We examine whether the prospective loss exerts an impact on 
the property final list price. If list-price updating removes all erstwhile effects of 
potential loss on the initial list price, we would expect that potential loss no longer 
affects the property final list price as it does with the initial list price. Table 5 presents 
the estimation results of the hedonic model. Irrespective of how the prospective loss is 
measured, it positively affects the property final list price, and the effect is statistically 
significant. This finding can be compared with the findings of Genesove and Mayer 
(2001), Anenberg (2011), and Bokhari and Geltner (2011) who show a positive effect 
of loss on sales price. Our results show that, despite the revealed list-price updating in 
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the listing process, sellers with potential loss show incomplete updating, since 
prospective loss is still reflected in final list prices.  





Loss  1.005 *** 
 
 




   
(0.003)  
Month dummy Yes 
 
Yes  
Year dummy Yes 
 
Yes  
Submarket dummy Yes 
 
Yes  











Notes: This table presents of the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of 
potential loss on the final list-price setting. The dependent variable is the log final list price. 
The independent variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon property initial listing and        
“D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Submarkets are the broker regions that are defined by the 
NVM, and 19 housing submarkets are distinguished in our dataset. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and 
* correspond to significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
7. Robustness check 
7.1 Seller motivation  
     The findings above portray a seemingly contradictory picture that sellers expecting 
loss are reluctant to realize potential loss initially but are more readily and more 
aggressively to cut the list prices afterward than other sellers. Here we consider 
whether heterogeneity in sellers could confound our results. In practice, sellers may 
be bounded by binding constraints upon property listing, for instance, having bought 
another house elsewhere. Hence, sellers with binding constraints are expected to be 
more motivated to sell during the listing process than other sellers by cutting the list 
price timely and more aggressively, especially during a market bust. Along these lines, 
it may be the case that the previous findings are driven by heterogeneity among sellers 
on the basis of their underlying motivation to sell. To investigate if this is indeed the 
case, we segment our sample on the basis of the listing spell, that is, the time on the 
market between the initial listing date and the date of final list-price posting. We 
associate short listing spell with sellers who are motivated to sell and vice versa. 
Three subsamples are distinguished based on the listing spell, i.e. within 3 months, 
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between 3 and 6 months and between 6 and 12 months. Segmenting the full sample in 
this way maintains the homogeneity of seller types within each of the subsamples.  
 Table 6 shows the results for the hedonic price model which examines the 
impact of prospective loss on initial list-price setting, using subsamples based on 
listing spell. What is revealed is that most of the house listings in our dataset 
experience a rather short listing spell, that is, within three months. Note, however, that 
this does not necessarily imply a sale, since properties may also end up being 
withdrawn from the market. The coefficients of the LOSS terms are comparable with 
those reported in Table 2 in terms of both sign and statistical significance which 
indicates that, despite seller heterogeneity, sellers who expect loss upon sale will set 
higher list prices to minimize their loss.  
      Table 7 presents the Probit regression results using the three subsamples on the 
basis of listing spell. For the seller group that is characterized by list-price updating 
within three months after initial listing, results are comparable to the main results in 
Table 3. Coefficients of both LOSS terms as well as the control variables remain 
statistically significant and are rather similar to their counterparts in Table 3. When 
examining the results based on seller groups with listing spell over three months, that 
is, between 3 and 6 months, and between 6 and 12 months, none of the coefficients of 
LOSS terms and the control variables appear to be statistically significant. These 
findings seem to indicate that seller heterogeneity in terms of motivation to sell is 
indeed one of the underlying drivers in our main results presented in Table 3 and list-
price revision is only more likely among motivated sellers with prospective loss than 
other sellers.   
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Table 6. Estimation results of the hedonic model for initial list price by listing spell 
 (1)  (2)  
Listing spell < 3 months     
Loss  1.042 *** 
 
 













20,675   
3 months < Listing spell < 6 months    
Loss  0.758 *** 
 
 













2,472   
6 months < Listing spell < 12 months    
Loss  1.089 *** 
 
 








 0.78  0.78  
N 2,269  2,269   
Month dummy Yes 
 
Yes  
Year dummy Yes 
 
Yes  
Submarket dummy Yes 
 
Yes  
Housing attribute controls Yes 
 
Yes  
Notes: This table presents of the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of 
potential loss on the initial list-price setting using subsamples based on listing spell. The 
dependent variable is the log initial list price. The independent variables “Loss” is the 
potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Submarkets 
are the broker regions that are defined by the NVM, and 19 housing submarkets are 
distinguished in our dataset. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for 
sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to significance level of 









Table 7. Probit regression results by listing spell 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Listing spell < 3 months       
Markup 0.811 *** 0.810 *** 0.768 *** 
 (0.127)  (0.127)  (0.130)  
Atypicality 0.113 ** 0.118 ** 0.117 ** 
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  
Market thinness -0.192 *** -0.207 *** -0.200 *** 
 (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074)  
Loss    0.715 ***   
   (0.252)    
D Loss     0.098 *** 
     (0.028)  
Constant -1.325 *** -1.340 *** -1.351 *** 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)  
Log likelihood -6,392  -6,389  -6,386  
N 20,675  20,675  20,675  
 3 months < Listing spell < 6 months     
Markup 0.406  0.419  0.332  
 (0.654)  (0.650)  (0.653)  
Atypicality -0.071  -0.061  -0.059  
 (0.235)  (0.238)  (0.237)  
Market thinness -0.266  -0.330  -0.297  
 (0.242)  (0.243)  (0.239)  
Loss    1.741    
   (3.01)    
D Loss     0.181  
     (0.116)  
Constant 2.151 *** 2.116 *** 2.103 *** 
 (0.063)  (0.069)  (0.072)  
Log likelihood -204  -203  -203  
N 2,472  2,472  2,472  
6 months < Listing spell < 12 months     
Markup 0.383  0.382  0.385  
 (0.956)  (0.953)  (0.980)  
Atypicality 0.290  0.293  0.290  
 (0.177)  (0.182)  (0.181)  
Market thinness -0.122  -0.131  -0.121  
 (0.215)  (0.209)  (0.206)  
Loss    0.275    
   (1.552)    
D Loss     -0.004  
     (0.190)  
Constant 2.219 *** 2.212 *** 2.220 *** 
 (0.091)  (0.100)  (0.109)  
Log likelihood -155  -155  -155  




       
Notes: This table presents the Probit regression results using subsamples based on listing 
spell to examine seller heterogeneity on the probability of list-price revision. The dependent 
variable is binary with list-price revision being 1, and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy 
for “Loss”. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling 
variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to significance level of 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively 
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 To investigate further whether the potential effect of seller heterogeneity on the 
magnitude of list-price revision given the occurrence list-price revision, we estimate 
the Tobit model using the same three subsamples. Results are reported in Table 8. For 
properties with a listing spell within three months, sellers tend to cut list price by 0.72% 
given 10% prospective loss, and, on average, the list-price revision of these sellers is 
0.9% higher than that of other sellers who do not expect loss upon sale. The signs and 
statistical significance of the coefficients of control variables are consistent with those 
of the main results in Table 4. When examining other seller groups with listing spells 
above three months, the coefficients of the LOSS terms are statistically significant, 
while all the control variables are statistically insignificant and some carry wrong 
signs as compared to their counterparts in Table 4. Overall, we interpret these results 
as suggesting that, when list-price revision occurs, seller heterogeneity in terms of 
motivation to sell does not seem to affect the magnitude of list-price revision. 
       Table 9 displays the results of hedonic model that investigates if prospective loss 
still affects final list-price setting among heterogeneous sellers in terms of motivation 
to sell. Results are rather similar to the findings shown in Table 5. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficients of both LOSS terms suggest that the earlier finding 
of incomplete learning is not driven by heterogeneity in motivation among sellers.  
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Table 8. Tobit regression results list-price revisions by listing spell 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Listing spell < 3 months       
Markup 0.064 *** 0.0638 *** 0.060 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  
Atypicality 0.010 ** 0.0104 *** 0.010 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Market thinness -0.014 ** -0.015 ** -0.014 ** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Loss    0.072 ***   
   (0.021)    
D Loss     0.009 *** 
     (0.002)  
Constant -0.105 *** -0.107 *** -0.108 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Log likelihood -2,026  -2,020  -2,017  
N 20,675  20,675  20,675  
 3 months < Listing spell < 6 months       
Markup -0.004  -0.003  -0.006  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Atypicality -0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Market thinness 0.006 * 0.005 * 0.006 * 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Loss    0.059 ***   
   (0.012)    
D Loss     0.006 *** 
     (0.001)  
Constant 0.045 *** 0.044 *** 0.043 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Log likelihood 5,421  5,438  5,435  
N 2,472  2,472  2,472  
6 months < Listing spell < 12 months       
Markup -0.001  -0.002  -0.005  
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Atypicality -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Market thinness 0.004  0.001  0.003  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Loss    0.084 ***   
   (0.014)    
D Loss     0.007 *** 
     (0.001)  
Constant 0.058 *** 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Log likelihood 4,615  4,637  4,627  
N 2,269  2,269  2,269  
Notes: This table presents the Tobit regression results using subsamples based on listing spell 
to investigate the potential impact of seller heterogeneity on the magnitude of list-price 
revision given revision occurs. The dependent variable is the percentage of list-price revision 
relative to the initial list price that is censored from below. The independent variables “Loss” 
is the potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS 





7.2 Equity position 
            Heterogeneity in equity position of sellers may explain the listing strategies of 
sellers. While in the Dutch housing market, there is no down payment requirement 
and mortgages are extended with recourse structure, sellers with poor equity position 
may nevertheless initially set higher list prices than the going market price and be 
reluctant to cut list prices subsequently in order to minimize their potential liability 
owed to mortgage providers. To address the potential influence of equity position on 
listing strategy, we check the robustness of the main results by holding period, that is, 
Table 9. Estimation results of the hedonic model for final list price by listing spell 
 (1)  (2)  
Listing spell < 3 months     
Loss  1.039 ***   
 (0.035)    
D Loss   0.101 *** 
 
  (0.004)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.75  0.75  
N 20,675  20,675  
 3 months < Listing spell < 6 months 
   Loss  0.739 ***  
 
(0.079) 
  D Loss 
  
0.067 *** 
   (0.008)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.76  0.76  
N 2,472  2,472  
6 months < Listing spell < 12 months    
Loss  1.045 ***  
 (0.080)   
D Loss   0.106 *** 
   (0.009)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.78  0.78  
N 2,269  2,269  
Month dummy Yes  Yes  
Year dummy Yes  Yes  
Submarket dummy Yes  Yes  
Housing attribute controls Yes  Yes  
Notes: This table presents of the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of 
potential loss on the final list-price setting using subsamples based on listing spell. The 
dependent variable is the log initial list price. The independent variables “Loss” is the 
potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Submarkets 
are the broker regions that are defined by the NVM, and 19 housing submarkets are 
distinguished in our dataset.  Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for 
sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to significance level of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively 
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the time elapsed between the last purchase and current listing. We conjecture that a 
longer holding period is associated with greater equity as mortgage is gradually 
amortized over time. We divide the sample on the basis of days between last purchase 




 percentile, into 
three subsamples.
12
 Appendix B summarizes the results. Overall, while seller 
heterogeneity in equity does play a role, our main results are not qualitatively 
different. 
7.3 Further robustness check 
        We further check the robustness of the main results by property type, that is, 
apartment, row house, and other property types. Appendix C summarizes the results. 
Irrespective of the property type, consistent findings are revealed with those using the 
full sample, which provide further evidence that our main results are not sensitive to 
heterogeneity in property type. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we investigate the listing strategy of sellers who are exposed to 
expected loss upon property listing during housing market downturn. Specifically, we 
examine whether prospective loss faced by sellers impacts the initial list-price setting, 
subsequent list-price revisions, and the final list-price setting. We show that, in 
general, sellers who face potential loss tend to set higher initial list prices. However, 
seller heterogeneity seems to drive the probability of list-price cutting during the 
property-listing spell such that only motivated sellers expecting loss upon initial 
listing are more likely and more aggressively to cut list prices during the listing stage 
than sellers who are not bounded by potential loss. In terms of the magnitude of list-
price revision given the occurrence of list-price revision, we find that sellers who are 
exposed to potential loss are more aggressive in list-price cutting than other sellers. 
Finally, to investigate whether list-price updating is complete, we test the effect of 
potential loss on the property final list price. We provide evidence of incomplete list-
price updating, since, despite the observed list-price adjustments, the perspective loss 
                                                          
12
 The 33rd and 67th percentiles of the distribution of days between last purchase and current listing 
correspond to 1,285 days and 2,074 days respectively. 
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is still found to positively affect the final list-price setting irrespective of seller 
heterogeneity.  
 Overall, these results indicate that, during a market bust, the impact of 
potential loss is present in the list-price setting such that sellers, who expect loss upon 
market entry do not cut loss instantly; however, only motivated sellers, who expect to 
sell at loss, postpone the list-price cutting during the property-listing stage such that 
their psychological aversion to loss is somewhat alleviated when they are exposed to 
market realities. Sellers still aim at higher final list price so that their prospective loss 
can be minimized. Our results provide important insights in understanding the 
behavior of housing market participants during the period of market downturn.  
       We recognize the deficiency in our data due to the unavailability of information 
on seller and buyer heterogeneity, which prevents us from further delineating the 
underlying reasons for observed list-price revision by sellers. For instance, 
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers may also affect list-price updating, 
since list price acts as a signal to convey private information of sellers to potential 
buyers. In the case of buyers and sellers with less information asymmetry, for 
example, they live in the same neighborhood, sellers facing potential loss may be 
reluctant to set the initial list price above the going market price, as a result, 
subsequent list-price revision may be less likely and limited if it indeed occurs. We 
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Appendix A Variable definitions 
Loss at initial listing date The natural log difference between the previous 
purchase price and the expected sales price at the date 
of listing truncated from below at zero, i.e. 
max (ln(𝑃𝑖𝑠) − ln (?̂?𝑖𝑡), 0)    
 
Markup at initial listing 
date 
 
The natural log difference between initial list price and 




Dummy which takes the value of 1 if the property size 
either falls below the 10
th
 percentile or lies above the 
90
th





Dummy which takes the value of 1 if the property’s 
first list price is above the 90
th
 percentile in the 
distribution of “First list price” and 0 otherwise, to 

























Appendix B Robustness check based on days between the last sale and current 
listing 
Table B1. Estimation results of the hedonic model – Effect of prospective loss on 
initial list price using subsamples based on quantile of days  
Dependent Variable: Log initial list price 
 (1)  (2) 
Days < 33
rd
 days percentile 
    
Loss  1.176***    
 (0.043)    
D Loss    
0.115*** 
 
   (0.005) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.77  0.77 
N 8,513  8,513 
33
rd




   
Loss  1.160***   
 
(0.044) 
  D Loss 
  
0.121*** 
   (0.005) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.75  0.75 
N 8,769  8,769 
Days > 67
th
 days percentile     
Loss  0.952***   
 (0.064)   
D Loss   0.094*** 
   (0.007) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.73  0.73 
N 8,515  8,515 
Month dummy YES  YES 
Year dummy YES  YES 
Submarket dummy YES  YES 
Housing attribute controls YES  YES 
Note: This table presents the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of potential loss 
on the initial list-price setting using subsamples based on days between the last sale and current 
listing. The dependent variable is the log initial list price. The independent variables “Loss” is the 
potential loss upon property initial listing that is measured in percentage relative to the property 
purchase price and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses 
to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to significance 















 (1) (2) (3) 
Days < 33
rd
 days percentile    
Markup 1.077*** 1.031*** 0.928*** 
 (0.170) (0.167) (0.167) 
Atypicality 0.025 0.035 0.032 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Market thinness -0.119 -0.148* -0.128 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) 
Loss   0.996***  
  (0.277)  
D Loss   0.144*** 
   (0.033) 
Constant -0.612*** -0.643*** -0.669*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
Log likelihood -4,946 -4,939 -4,934 
N 8,513 8,513 8,513 
33
rd
 days percentile < Days < 67
th
 days percentile    
Markup 1.037*** 1.053*** 0.947*** 
 (0.154) (0.157) (0.157) 
Atypicality 0.141*** 0.153*** 0.154*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
Market thinness -0.392*** -0.430*** -0.411*** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) 
Loss   1.505***  
  (0.249)  
D Loss   0.202*** 
   (0.033) 
Constant -0.637*** -0.671*** -0.692*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
Log likelihood -5,022 -5,009 -5,003 
N 8,769 8,769 8,769 
Days > 67
th
 days percentile    
Markup 0.684*** 0.686*** 0.670*** 
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) 
Atypicality 0.116* 0.117* 0.119* 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
Market thinness -0.167** -0.170** -0.174** 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) 
Loss   0.215  
  (0.380)  
D Loss   0.079* 
   (0.040) 
Constant -0.584*** -0.586*** -0.596*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Log likelihood -5,048 -5,048 -5,046 
N 8,515 8,515 8,515 
Note: This table presents the Probit regression results using subsamples based on days between the last 
sale and current listing. The dependent variable is binary with list-price revision being 1 and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon property initial listing that is 
measured in percentage relative to the property purchase price and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. 




Table B3. Tobit regression results using subsamples based on quantile of days 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Days < 33
rd
 days percentile    
Markup 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Atypicality 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market thinness -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Loss   0.096***  
  (0.018)  
D Loss   0.012*** 
   (0.002) 
Constant -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.046*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Loglikelihood -53 -39 -35 
N 8,513 8,513 8,513 
33
rd
 days percentile < Days < 67
th
 days percentile    
Markup 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.059*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Atypicality 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market thinness -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Loss   0.133***  
  (0.018)  
D Loss   0.017*** 
   (0.002) 
Constant -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.049*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Loglikelihood -177 -155 -149 
N 8,769 8,769 8,769 
Days > 67
th
 days percentile    
Markup 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Atypicality 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Market thinness -0.011* -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Loss   0.046  
  (0.028)  
D Loss   0.008*** 
   (0.003) 
Constant -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loglikelihood -148 -147 -144 





Note: This table presents the Tobit regression results using subsamples based on days between the last 
sale and current listing. The dependent variable is the percentage of list-price revision relative to the initial 
list price that is censored from below. The independent variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon 
property initial listing that is measured in percentage relative to the property purchase price and “D Loss” is 
the dummy for “Loss”. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation 




Table B4. Estimation results of the hedonic model – Effect of prospective loss on 
final list price using subsamples based on quantile of days 
Dependent Variable: Log final list price 
 (1)  (2) 
Days < 33
rd
 days percentile     
Loss  1.161***    
 (0.045)    
D Loss    0.113*** 
 
   (0.005) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.77  0.76 
N 8,513  8,513 
33
rd




   Loss  
1.151***   
 
(0.045) 
  D Loss 
  
0.120*** 
   (0.005) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.75  0.75 
N 8,769  8,769 
Days > 67
th
 days percentile    
Loss  0.952***   
 (0.064)   
D Loss   0.093*** 
   (0.007) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.73  0.73 
N 8,515  8,515 
Month dummy YES  YES 
Year dummy YES  YES 
Submarket dummy YES  YES 
Housing attribute controls YES  YES 
Note: This table presents the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of 
potential loss on the final list-price setting using subsamples based on days between the last 
sale and current listing. The dependent variable is the log initial list price. The independent 
variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon property initial listing that is measured in percentage 
relative to the property purchase price and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , 














Appendix C Robustness check based on property type  
 
Table C1. Estimation results of the hedonic model – Effect of prospective loss on 
initial list price using subsamples based on property type 
Dependent Variable: Log initial list price 
 (1)  (2) 
Property type: Apartment     
Loss  0.927***    
 (0.036)    
D Loss    0.087*** 
 
   (0.004) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.69  0.68 
N 15,351  15,351 
Property type: Row house 
   Loss  
0.841***   
 
(0.052) 
  D Loss 
  
0.080*** 
   (0.005) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.66  0.66 
N 6,729  6,729 
Property type: Other    
Loss  1.082***   
 (0.065)   
D Loss   0.119*** 
   (0.007) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.78  0.78 
N 3,746  3,746 
Month dummy YES  YES 
Year dummy YES  YES 
Submarket dummy YES  YES 
Housing attribute controls YES  YES 
Note: This table presents the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of potential 
loss on the initial list-price setting using subsamples based on property type. The dependent 
variable is the log initial list price. The independent variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon 
property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Bootstrapped standard errors are in 
parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to 







Table C2. Probit regression results using subsamples based on property type 
Note: This table presents the Probit regression results using subsamples based on property 
type. The dependent variable is binary with list-price revision being 1 and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is 
the dummy for “Loss”. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for 
sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to significance level of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Property type: Apartment    
Markup 1.052*** 1.044*** 0.972*** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) 
Atypicality 0.063* 0.066* 0.067* 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) 
Market thinness -0.378*** -0.403*** -0.394*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
Loss   0.832***  
  (0.240)  
D Loss   0.146*** 
   (0.024) 
Constant -0.603*** -0.621*** -0.643*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Log likelihood -8,966 -8,959 -8,948 
N 15,351 15,351 15,351 
 Property type: Row house    
Markup 0.798*** 0.830*** 0.779*** 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.170) 
Atypicality -0.268 -0.254 -0.255 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.173) 
Market thinness -0.490*** -0.511*** -0.494*** 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) 
Loss   1.013***  
  (0.305)  
D Loss   0.113*** 
   (0.033) 
Constant -0.625*** -0.648*** -0.656*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Log likelihood -3,864 -3,860 -3,859 
N 6,729 6,729 6,729 
Property type: Other    
Markup 0.737*** 0.714*** 0.651*** 
 (0.215) (0.214) (0.215) 
Atypicality 0.273*** 0.296*** 0.280*** 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) 
Market thinness -0.112 -0.137** -0.119* 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Loss   1.298***  
  (0.417)  
D Loss   0.136*** 
   (0.047) 
Constant -0.609*** -0.640*** -0.649*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Log likelihood -2,192 -2,187 -2,188 




Table C3. Tobit regression results using subsamples based on property type 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Property type: Apartment    
Markup 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Atypicality 0.005* 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market thinness -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Loss   0.080***  
  (0.017)  
D Loss   0.012*** 
   (0.002) 
Constant -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.045*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Loglikelihood -157 -144 -132 
N 15,351 15,351 15,351 
Property type: Row house    
Markup 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Atypicality -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Market thinness -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Loss   0.100***  
  (0.022)  
D Loss   0.010*** 
   (0.002) 
Constant -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Loglikelihood -137 -128 -129 
N 6,729 6,729 6,729 
Property type: Other    
Markup 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Atypicality 0.016** 0.018** 0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Market thinness -0.007 -0.009* -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loss   0.115***  
  (0.030)  
D Loss   0.012*** 
   (0.004) 
Constant -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loglikelihood -90 -83 -84 




Note: This table presents the Tobit regression results using subsamples based on property 
type. The dependent variable is the percentage of list price revision relative to the initial list 
price that is censored from below. The independent variables “Loss” is the potential loss upon 
property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * 




Table C4. Estimation results of the hedonic model – Effect of prospective loss on 
final list price using subsamples based on property type 
Dependent Variable: Log final list price 
 (1)  (2) 
Property type: Apartment     
Loss  0.927***    
 (0.037)    
D Loss    0.087*** 
 
   (0.004) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.69  0.68 
N 15,351  15,351 
Property type: Row house 
   Loss  
0.832***   
 
(0.053) 
  D Loss 
  
0.080*** 
   (0.005) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.66  0.66 
N 6,729  6,729 
Property type: Other    
Loss  1.055***   
 (0.066)   
D Loss   0.117*** 
   (0.007) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.78  0.78 
N 3,746  3,746 
Month dummy YES  YES 
Year dummy YES  YES 
Submarket dummy YES  YES 
Housing attribute controls YES  YES 
Note: This table presents the results of the hedonic model that investigates the effect of 
potential loss on the final list-price setting using subsamples based on property type. The 
dependent variable is the log initial list price. The independent variables “Loss” is the 
potential loss upon property initial listing and “D Loss” is the dummy for “Loss”. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses to account for sampling variation in the 
LOSS terms. *** , ** , and * correspond to significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
